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Humanitarian Law, El Salvador, and Protocol II: Do These
Equal Substantive International Law?
One possible perception of today's world is that it is inhabited by ranks
of sadistic, slavering government enforcers living only for the day they
can run amok in the streets, breaking the bones of small children and old
men. This perception is bolstered by daily news reports depicting the
often arbitrary and excessive use of force against civilians suspected of
supporting insurgent forces in countries such as Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Sudan, El Salvador and Israel's Occupied Territories. Scenes of the murder
and rapine inflicted on the residents of villages became familiar to American television viewers during the Vietnam war. The generation that has
grown to adulthood since that time is no less familiar with similar images
generated by modem day conflicts.
Another subject often mentioned in news reports is the humanitarian work done during periods of large-scale, politically-motivated violence by various groups and individuals, such as the International
Organization of the Red Cross and Red Crescent ("IRC"). The IRC and
like groups provide food, shelter, and medical aid to noncombatants' and
encourage compliance with the ideals of humanitarian law.2 Individuals
from these groups have gone into areas of conflict, administering medical
care and rebuilding civilian homes and villages. Some of these people act
in order to directly support insurgent forces. Others have conditioned
their aid to the noncombatant population on their ability to remain
neutral.3
Violence against non-combatants in an international armed conflict
I Veuthey, Implementation andEnforcement of HumanitarianLaw and Human Rights Law in
Non-InternationalConflicts: The Role ofthe InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, 33 AM. U.L.
REv. 93(1983). For clarification of the term "noncombatant" see Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. Included in the class of
noncombatants are prisoners of war ('POWs"), civilian internees, and the civilian population at
large. See id. art. 3.
2 Veuthey, supra note 1, at 84, 93; Moreillon, HumanitarianLaw, the ICRC andPromotingthe
Geneva Conventions, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 819, 822 (1982).
3 See generally C. CLEMENTS, WrrNESS To WAR (1984) (for ajournal of a doctor in the Salvadoran countryside who refused to compromise his neutrality).
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is forbidden by several international agreements,4 and violence by a state
against its own nationals during an internal armed conflict is specifically
circumscribed by Protocols I and II.1 The prohibition against attack on
civilian targets during state-to-state wars has, to a large extent, been
complied with by the opposing governments. However, the 1977 Protocols have not proved to be as successful in protecting noncombatants
from harm during civil wars.
The apparent conflict between state behavior and Protocols I and II
indicates: 1) states believe these agreements do not apply in their particular circumstances; 2) states agree as to the general applicability of the
relevant agreement, but do not agree as to the interpretation of specific
articles; or 3) states agree as to the interpretation and applicability of the
agreements, but consider it impractical to abide by them. This Note will
focus on a relatively recent humanitarian law agreement, Protocol II,
and its application to the civil war in El Salvador in an effort to determine the answer to two questions. First, why is there an apparent conflict between agreement and practice; and second, is resolution of this
conflict and the subsequent strengthening of international law being furthered by the interplay between the Salvadoran Government and the opposing rebels?
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

Humanitarian law experts have estimated that since World War II
civil wars have claimed four times more victims than international armed
conflicts.6 Put another way, "non-international wars account for approximately eighty percent of the victims" of armed conflicts during the same
period.7 This is a startling fact, until one recalls that before the 1977
Protocols no specific rules were in effect to govern non-international conflicts. Before 1977, state and rebel forces essentially had an internationally granted carte blanche when it came to dealing with armed opposition
and its civilian supporters. These conflicts were considered strictly domestic issues. However, the wanton destruction and the increasing
4 See generally Geneva Conventions, supra note I (addressing the rights of noncombatants in
an international armed conflict, except for common article 3, which refers to internal armed
conflicts).
5 See generally Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocols I and II),
Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1442 [hereinafter Protocols I or II]. Protocol I governs
"armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination ... alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination .. ." Id. art. 1, para. 4.
Protocol II applies "to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article I [of Protocol I] ..
Id. art. 1, para. 1. This is a generic reference to civil wars based on political differences.
6 Associated Press, June 6, 1977.
7 DeSchutter & DeWyngaert, Coping with Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts: BorderlineBetween Nationaland InternationalLaw, 13 CA. J. INT'L & COMP L. 279, 279 (1982).
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awareness of the world as a global community persuaded state governments that the quality of life enjoyed by all individuals should not be
beyond their concern.
Humanitarian law is an outgrowth of the law of war and the law of
human rights.8 While it shares certain ideas and values with these two
areas, humanitarian law has distinct features justifying its classification
as a separate body of law. To understand these features, first it is important to appreciate the genealogy of humanitarian laws.
A.

The Law of War

After much development through custom and scholarly writing, the
concept of the law of war is fairly well established in international law.9
The bulk of the law was codified in the late 19th century, in the Hague
Conventions.' 0 In addition to the fact that Hague Conventions provide
for individual" as well as state responsibility for violations of the law of
way they also
regulate such matters as the weapons to be used, the restraints or conditions on the use of weapons, the targets that may legitimately be
attacked, the duration and amount of force that may be applied, the
conditions under which reprisals and other specific kinds of force can
be instituted, the rights of military personnel under combat conditions,
and the complicated questions associated with the defense of superior
orders. 12
While the Hague Conventions "civilized" war, they were seen as applying only to hostilities between sovereign states' 3 and were only incidentally concerned with the protection of civilians."
8 Schindler, Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw: Interrelationshipof the Laws, 31 AM.
U.L. REV. 935, 935 (1982).
9 Id.
10 See id. at 935, 943. There were 13 Hague Conventions adopted in 1907. Fleiner-Gerster &
Meyer, New Developments in HumanitarianLaw: A Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 267, 270 n.7 (1985).
11 An example of this individual responsibility is demonstrated by Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d
184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
12 Almond, The Teachingand Dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the UnitedStates, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 981, 991 (1982). The rule of thumb used by
today's war makers is called "military necessity." Only the minimum force needed to achieve a
military objective should be used, thus only legitimate military targets (armories, military bases)
rather than random civilian ones should be attacked. Id. at 992.
13 The Geneva Conventions have historically been considered a part of the law of war and
consequently may be applied only to acts of belligerency among sovereign states. See infra note 21
and accompanying text. This is reflected in art. 2: "the present Convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between.., the High Contracting
Parties....
Geneva Conventions, supranote 1, art. 2 (emphasis added). See also Draper, Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed Conflicts, 13 GA. . INT'L & COMP. L. 253, 268-69 (1982).
14 See Almond, supra note 12, at 991.
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InternationalHuman Rights Law

The concept of international human rights is a recent phenomenon
that did not develop outside the domestic law of individual states until
the end of World War II.15 Various international human rights agreements deal with subjects ranging from the general 6 to the specific;17
from the basic 8 to the esoteric. 9 All of the agreements have two clauses
in common. First, they grant states the right to derogate a majority of
their obligations during times of public emergency or war. 20 Consequently, these agreements provide little restraint on a state during an
armed conflict. Second, allegations of violations may be heard before an
international tribunal when filed by a Contracting Party or by an individual once that individual has exhausted available domestic remedies. 2 1
Unfortunately, this enforcement mechanism is flawed in that war victims
are ill-equipped to seek domestic remedies should any be offered. 22
C. HumanitarianLaw
Humanitarian law, compared to the law of war and the principles of
international human rights, is new to international law. While the humanitarian efforts of the IRC for the protection of prisoners of war were
first mentioned in the 1920 Geneva Conventions, 23 the expression "humanitarian law" was not used to describe the ideals of the Geneva Con-

ventions until the

1950s. 2 4

Before that, the Geneva Conventions were

15 Schindler, supra note 8, at 936. Human rights, such as the abolition of slavery and freedom
of speech, "primarily concern relations between states and their own nationals ....
Id.
16 See generally Szabo, HistoricalFoundationsofHuman Rights andSubsequent Developments,
in I THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11-42 (P. Alston ed. 1982)(for a discussion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its role as a basis for other agreements).
17 See generally Kartashkin, Economic, Social and CulturalRights, in I THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 111-34 (P. Alston ed. 1982)(this provides a description of ten very
specific rights considered in various human rights agreements, including the rights to an adequate
standard of living, and trade union rights).
18 See generally Partsch, FundamentalPrinciplesof Human Rights: Self-Determination,Equality and Non-Discrimination,in I THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 61-86 (P.
Alston ed. 1982)(the rights discussed here are considered the underpinnings of the observations of
human rights in any society).
19 See generally Kartashkin, supra note 17, at 127-29 (for a discussion of cultural rights).
20 See, eg., InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, art. 4, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Soc. A/6316 (1966); European Conventionfor the Protection
of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
21 Schindler, supra note 8, at 941.
22 Id. First, a government is very unlikely to provide the mechanisms for prosecution of its
own representatives. Second, even if the procedures for prosecution are available, civilians under
siege have neither the financial nor the legal resources to pursue their rights. Id.
23 Moreillon, supra note 2, at 819.
24 Schindler, supra note 8, at 935.
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considered a part of the law of war.25 The startling loss of civilian life in
armed conflicts in the 1960s, as seen in the Nigeria-Biafra, Vietnam and
India-Pakistan conflicts, indicated to the world's governments that clear,
strong rules were needed to govern ,the use of force against noncombatants.2 6 As a result, Protocols I and II were negotiated and opened for
signature in 1977.
While human rights law theoretically applies in both peace and war

time, humanitarian law is engineered to meet the specific problems
presented in an armed conflict.2 7 Also, it is arguable that the obligations
to which a state is subject may not be derogated, since there is no specific
provision granting derogations.28
Humanitarian law is like the law of war29 in that it holds individuals
as well as states responsible for force used against noncombatants, 30 but
it increases the effectiveness of enforcement. First, agreements provide
for a rudimentary monitoring system by the IRC.31 Furthermore, humanitarian
law protects noncombatants caught up in an internal armed
32
conflict.

II. PROTOCOL II

A.

Why Protocol II Developed
Common article 333 of the four Geneva Conventions extends some

protection to noncombatants in an internal conflict, but critics assert that
it harbors four major weaknesses. First, victims of internal armed conflicts are not extended the same level of protection as victims of interna25 Id.
26 Id. at 937. See also Gasser, A Brief Analysis of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 19 AKRON L.
REv. 525, 525 (1986).
27 Schindler, supra note 8, at 938. "[It is] adapted... to ... situations confronting wounded

and sick members of armed forces, prisoners of war, civilian internees, and others persons who are in
the power of an adverse party. The humanitarian law conventions offer these persons far more
protection than do the general guarantees of the human rights conventions." Id. at 940.
28 There is no express counterpart to the derogation clauses found in human rights conventions. See supranote 20 and accompanying text. Contra Protocol II, supra note 5,art. 3, para. 1; see
infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text for the assertion that there is at least an implied derogation
clause in Protocol II.
29 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
30 Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol11 and its Relation to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 9, 12 (1983). Common

article 3 is expanded on in Protocols I and II, retaining the element of individual responsibility.
31 Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, art. 3(2); Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 81; Protocol II,
supra note 5, art. 18.
32 Compare Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, art. 3 with Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 1 (the
Protocols address only internal armed conflict).
33 Common article 3 refers to article 3 which is found in all four Geneva Conventions. It
contains the following provisions:
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tional armed conflicts.34 The lack of provisions for providing aid and
specific minimum standards for the treatment of detainees makes the
stated principles easy to circumvent.3 1 Second, the procedure for enforcement is unclear. 36 This is primarily because common article 2 "defines the scope of the Conventions in a way that does not include noninternational armed conflicts." 37 Given this, it would appear that article
3 needs to set up a separate enforcement provision in order to provide
any remedy for violation of the rights it professes to grant. Unfortunately, this is not done. 38 Next, it is argued, there is no definition of
"internal armed conflict" to indicate when the article can be invoked.39
Finally, protection is provided for those already victims of a conflict,
rather than preventing noncombatants from becoming victims.'
Protocol II was initially drafted by the IRC in an effort to address
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character... each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:(
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities ... shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely...
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever...
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court ....
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, art. 3.
34 See Junod, Additional ProtocolII. History and Scope, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 29, 31 (1983).
35 Id.

36 Lysaght, supra note 30, at 12.
37 Id.
38 See id.

39 Id. at 14 (stating "[t]he article itself attempts no definition in terms of levels of force or of
rebel control of territory..."). Contra Junod, supra note 34, at 30 (stating "the concept of armed
conflict is generally recognized as... open, armed confrontation between relatively organized armed
forces or armed groups."). However, if this notion were so recognized, it is doubtful the drafters of
Protocol II would have expressed so, particularly the conditions precedent to its invocation: there
must be a conflict between the armed forces of a Contracting Party and dissident armed forces, and
the dissent forces must be "under responsible command, and exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concentrated military operations and to implement this Protocol." Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 1(1). The drafters added a clarification, expressing that internal disturbances like riots or "isolated and sporadic acts of violence" are not
considered armed conflicts. Id. art. 1(2). The present day conflicts in the Occupied Territories
would appear not to be covered by Protocol II because the Palestinians do not have that element of
organized resistance needed. In contrast, the Eritrean rebellion in Ethiopia has an organization and
maintains control of large amounts of territory and so would be covered by Protocol II.
40 Lysaght, supra note 30, at 14.
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these weaknesses and to expand the application of common article 341 in
particular to civil wars. 2 It was opened for signature in 1977 after four
years of negotiations by over 100 countries.4 3 As of December 31, 1986,
sixty states had become parties.' Opinions of the finished document
have varied. It has been said that "the mass murder of civilians is made
illegal, even if such killings would not amount to genocide because they
lack racial or religious motives."4 In contrast, the text has been decried
as being "a statement of good intentions devoid of any real humanitarian
substance and of any mandatory character." 4 6 While these statements
appear to be irreconcilable, they are both true.
B.

Textual Weaknesses in ProtocolII

Under Protocol II the mass killing of civilians has been outlawed. 7
Unfortunately, the very text of the Protocol makes compliance completely discretionary and unenforceable, thus providing the potential for
a state to strip the document of any substantive impact within its borders. This potentially fatal weakness becomes apparent in an examination of Protocol II, article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2.
The discretionary portion of the text is found in article 3, entitled
Non-intervention states: "1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked
for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility
of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish
law and order.., or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity
of the State."4 The purpose of this clause was to encourage states to
become parties to the agreement, since it was felt that no state would
willingly apply the Protocol if application meant the possibility that its
sovereignty would be diminished.4 9 Unfortunately, this clause provides
41 See Junod, supra note 34, at 31.
42 See supra note 39.
43 DeSaussure, Symposium on the 1977 Geneva Protocols,Introduction 19 AKRON L. REV. 521,

521 (1986).
44 International Committee of the Red Cross, STATUS OF FOUR GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I AND II, Dec. 31, 1985, reprintedin 26 LL.M. 553, 560 (1987). Protocol
I's date of entry into force was determined by ratification by two signatories and the subsequent
passage of six months. Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 23. This resulted in an effective date of Dec. 7,
1978. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra at 553.
45 Nelson, President Urges Ratification of Outlawing Murder During Civil Wars, Associated
Press, Jan. 29, 1987 (quoting President Reagan asking the Senate for ratification of Protocol II).
46 Lysaght, supra note 30, at 10 (quoting the delegate of the Holy See).
47 Nelson, supra note 45 (President Reagan offered no definition of "mass murder").
48 Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 1.
49 See Lysaght, supra note 30, at 21.
Each party to ...a conflict, but especially the legal government, usually considers itself as
having sole jurisdiction over the territory of the State. Acceptance of the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions may imply recognition of the other party as sovereign, having
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wording much like the derogation clauses of human rights agreements.5 °
This language, by itself, causes potential problems in applying Protocol
II to internal armed conflicts, much like those encountered in human
rights agreements. 51 Fortunately, the superior quasi-law-of-war enforcement mechanisms 52 are left untouched by paragraph 1; the issue is one of
interpretation through interchange among the parties to define terms
such as "by all legitimate means" 5 3 and "re-establish law and order."5 4
This interchange can take many forms, ranging from diplomatic notes
passed by ambassadors, to statements to the media by "high-ranking government officials," or even to actual challenges in the International Court
of Justice. Whatever its form, the purposes of these actions are twofold
for the states: 1) to characterize its conduct as lawful under international
law; and 2) to mold international public opinion so that it is favorable to
the issuing state's position.55
However, the second paragraph of article 2 makes the above mentioned interchange virtually impossible among states and, consequently,
the Protocol internationally unenforceable. It states that "[n]othing in
this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the
internal ...affairs of the... Party .... "I 6 The inclusion of this paragraph could mean that should a state decide that Protocol II, as a whole
or in part, does not apply in its situation, no other state may enter into a
dialogue with that state concerning the legitimacy of its actions. This
kind of interaction could easily be called indirect intervention, thus inappropriate under article 3, paragraph 2. This assertion is based on the fact
that "intervention" is not defined in Protocol II, and naturally any state
will press for the interpretation most favorable to its position if
challenged.5 7
It is possible that Protocol II could, ultimately, be a strong, effective
document. Under traditional international law, once there is a signed
and effective agreement between two or more states, international law
jurisdiction over the territory under its control. This is a position which the incumbent
legal government can almost never accept.
Fleiner-Gerster & Meyer, supra note 10, at 270.
50 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 20, 28 and accompanying text.
52 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32,
53 This phrase is not defined in the Protocol. However, it has been suggested that should the
standards of permissible conduct under Protocol II for any reason not apply, the standards of conduct under common article 3 would remain. See Junod, supra note 34, at 35.
54 This is an incredibly broad directive with no guidance given in the Protocol.
55 See Almond, supra note 12, at 986-87. See also R. Wallace, INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1986).

56 Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 2.
57 See Matheson, PracticalConsiderationsfor the Development of LegalStandardsfor Intervention, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 205, 206 (1982).
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concerning the substance of that agreement is established. While in principle there are formal processes that can establish procedures and institutions for interpreting and applying an agreement,"8 the reality is that
agreements are skeletal in nature and devoid of substance and meaning
until implemented as part of the policies of a state. 59 Even those states
that profess the nonapplicability of an agreement may give tacit acceptance to its provisions. By giving acceptance, the state is aiding in the
formation of substantive international law.' Regardless of the posturing
by states concerning the nonapplicability of an agreement, it is the actual
interrelationship of policy and action that makes codified international
law more than illusory.6 1
What makes Protocol II particularly interesting is that it shifts the
dialogue from a state-to-state to a state-to-insurgent conflict. The nature
of humanitarian law and Protocol II requires the international community to consider not only how other states react to the besieged state's
acts, but also to analyze the ability and the willingness of the parties to a
civil war to abide by humanitarian standards. Therein lies the hope for
effective humanitarian law through Protocol I1.62 The non-intervention
clause has only the strength that states give it. Likewise, other provisions
may gain in legal significance through compliance by the government
and rebel forces, and what is written as discretionary in the agreement
may evolve into a legal obligation.63

III.

HUMANITARIAN LAW IN EL SALVADOR

El Salvador's political history has long been one of coups and
revolution, both peaceful and violent6': A bloodless coup on October 15,
197965 began a series of events that even today are subject to much speculation and analysis.
Following the October 15 coup, a five member council of two military officers and three civilians was put into a ruling position in the country. 66 Immediately, this council was politically attacked by both leftwing ("FMLN") 67 and right-wing National Republican Alliance
58 Almond, supra note 12, at 987.
59 Id.

60
61
62
63

DeSaussure, supra note 43, at 523.
See Almond, supra note 12, at 1002.
See infra text accompanying notes 64-95.
An example of a discretionary provision is art. 18, giving the ICRC the right to request entry

into a country to provide aid to noncombatants. While there is no legal obligation to grant the
requests, few countries refuse the IRC entry.
64 Communist Interference in El Salvador, DEP'T. ST. BULL. 7-9 (Mar. 1981).
65 Id. at 7.
66 The council was "composed of two moderate colonels and three reform-minded civilians."
On the Bink, TIME, Feb. 18, 1980 at 38.
67 The left wing faction is composed of four Marxist-Leninist groups (the Communist Party,
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("ARENA")6" extremists.69 The FMLN has as its ultimate goal the establishment of a better way of life for the peasants who make up 94% of
El Salvador's population.7' While the ideal economic system, capitalist
or socialist, is still being debated, the FMLN espouses land reform and
redistribution, and a democratic political system. The FMLN has
adopted an aggressive guerrilla warfare approach to affect the changes its
members seek.7 1 To date, they have refused to participate in the national
elections unless certain demands modifying the electoral system are
met.7 2 The elections are not considered democratic.by the FMLN since
all eligible voters must have their identity cards stamped to show they
voted or face harsh consequences,
and every vote is traceable back to the
73
individual who cast it.
The ARENA forces are utilizing a combination of government infiltration and paramilitary "death squads." 7 4 ARENA willingly participates in the national elections and consequently has a number of its
members in high government positions. Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, a
recent president of the Constituent Assembly, is a member of ARENA
and at times has been its leader.7 5 He has also been recognized as a dithe National Resistance, the Popular Liberation Forces, and the Popular Revolutionary Army) and
three minor, non-communist groups. DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 63, at 2, 7. These groups have
coalesced into an umbrella organization called the Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Front
("FMLN"). Id. at 1; Smolowe, Meanwhile, in El Salvador. . . , TIME Aug. 24, 1987, at 30.
68 The right-wing party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance ("ARENA") is supported by the
elite landowners and military officers and has strong ties with the death squads. J. DOMINGUEZ &
M. LINDENBERG, CENTRAL AMERICA, CURRENT CRISIS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 28 (Foreign

Policy Association Headline Series No. 271, 1984).
69 Id.

70 Dickey, Dream of Agrarian Reform Seems to be Dying in El Salvador, Wash. Post, Oct. 3,
1983, at A12, col. I reprinted in CLEMENTS, supra note 3, at 260.
71 See Svoboda, Up Against HardRealities, TIME Dec. 1, 1986, at 40 ("The FMLN is waging a
war of attrition .... "). This strategy is being followed in the hope of sparking a revolution among
the nation's poor. One Step Closer to Anarchy, TIME, Nov. 12, 1979, at 59.
72 El Salvador rebelspreparemajor assaults,Plain Dealer (Cleveland),Jan. 29, 1989, at A8, col.
3.
73 CLEMENTS, supra note 3, at 58 (These consequences vary from harassment by government
security forces to "disappearances" of whole families).
74 See Dealing in Death, TIME, Oct. 24, 1984, at 44.
The right-wing terrorist groups have plagued the country since the beginning of El Salvador's guerilla war in 1979. The recent attacks ... have been aimed at... student leaders,
professors and labor officials who are considered sympathetic to the left. Human rights
activists and Western diplomats believe that many of the death squads are led by officers in
the Salvadoran army and security forces. Id.
These groups have also been called "hit teams obedient to the country's ultra-conservative
elite." One Step Closer to Anarchy, supra note 71, at 59.
75 Roberto D'Aubuisson was the ARENA leader until the 1984 elections, when he lost his
presidency to Ricardo Valdivieso, an ARENA member. Plain Dealer (Cleveland) Feb. 28, 19889 at
A10. D'Aubuisson is contending for power in the 1989 elections and within ARENA against Alfredo Cristiani. Id. Mar. 12, 1989 at A5.

HUMANITARIAN LAW

rector of the death squads.76 These squads routinely terrorize the civilian
population in an effort to reduce the logistical support given to the
FMLN by the people in the countryside.
The Salvadoran Government has taken the position that the rebel
force within the country is the FMLN, not the paramilitary groups. This
is due both to the FMLN's objective of overthrowing the established
Government 77 and its potential ability to do so.7 8 The end result of the
1979 "bloodless coup d'etat ' 79 was that the nine year old civil war in El
Salvador claimed an estimated 61,000 lives.80 Human rights groups estimate that 80% of those killed were civilians slain by the paramilitary
groups.8" This casualty rate is astonishing considering the country's

small size and population level.82

El Salvador is a party to Protocol II, but the Government has refused to apply its provisions to the civil war.83 The basis for this refusal
seems to be ignorance of the protection that article 3 gives to sovereign
states. 84 The Government's refusal is allegedly based on its fear that applying these provisions to the civil war "would increase the international
status of... [the rebels], implying the rebels have rights as 'belligerents'
. ."85 A statement of this kind is based on the historic law of war idea
that only sovereign states can be considered belligerents. This is plainly
at odds with the provisions of Protocol II, articles 186 and 3.87 Together,
these articles extend the rights and obligations of the Protocol to both
76 CLEMENTS, supra note 3, at 92, 261; see also DIDION, SALVADOR 18 (1983)(quoting a Jan.
15, 1982 memo from the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador to the U.S. State Department).
77 DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 64, at 1.

78 The IRC has recognized that the internal conflict in El Salvador meets the threshold of a
civil war under Protocol II. See Goldman, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the Armed Conflicts in El Salvadorand Nicaragua,2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 539, 550 (1987), citing to INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 29, 37 (1984). For a more complete analysis of
how the FMLN has met the threshold requirements of control of territory, see Goldman, supra, at
550.
79 DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 64, at 7.

80 De Arellano, Fighting Halted During Vaccination Campaign, United Press Int'l, Feb. 28,
1988.
81 Allen, Associate Press, Dec. 7, 1982 (Nexis). It has been estimated that 80% of casualties in
all armed conflicts since 1980 ... were civilians." HARPER'S MAGAZINE, reprintedin The Plain
Dealer (Cleveland), May 1, 1988 at C3.
82 El Salvador has approximately the same area as Massachusetts, with a population that
equals Chicago's, approximately 3.4 million people. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 454,
872, 246 (2d ed. 1980).
83 International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 44, at 558. See also Junod, supra note
34, at 39. To date, there has been no formal announcement recognizing the applicability of Protocol
II.
84 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
85 Dinges, Red Cross Said Ready to Quit ElSalvador, Washington Post, July 3, 1982 at Al, col.
I.
86 "This Protocol... shall apply to all armed conflicts... which take place in the territory of a
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rebel and government forces without causing any limitation on the sovereignty of the recognized government.
Why has El Salvador's government chosen to ignore article 3, paragraph 1? The rebels fulfill the requirements of article 1, paragraph 1; the
FMLN holds up to 20% of the country's territory under such control;"8
they have long-term bases; and they are capable of keeping prisoners.8 9
The internal conflict is not excludable under article 1, paragraph 2,
as no one has suggested that the civil war is a sporadic event.90 Thus, the
general applicability of the Protocol is not in question. Additionally,
there has been no question raised by El Salvador as to the interpretation
of any of the privisions. The complete discounting of article 3, paragraph
1 is not an interpretative issue, but simply relfects a state decision not to
apply the Protocol.
It is the practicality of the Protocol with which the Goverment has
problems. It is apparent that by not extending the rights and obligations
of the Protocol to the civil war, the government is in a superior position
to put down the rebellion. This is because if Protocol II is not applied,
the government is constrained in its actions only by international human
rights that are so fundamental they cannot be derogated; unfortunately,
the human rights enforcement mechanism is then the only civilian relief
in place. 9 1 Government policies for battling the rebels reflect this relization. The government of El Salvador has nothing to lose domestically or
internationally by following these policies. Domestically, they are in an
effective position to weaken civilian support for the FMLN. Internationally, there is an obligation in article 3, paragraph 1 to apply the Protocol,
but El Salvador is insulated from international censure by article 3, para-

graph

2.92

The FMLN, on the other hand, has claimed it seeks to invoke the
...Party between its armed forces and... organized armed groups .. " Protocol II, supra note 5,
art. 1, para. 1.
87 "Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a
State .
I...
Id. art. 3, para. 1.
88 DOMINGUEZ & LINDENBERG, supra note 68, at 26.
89 Dinges, supra note 85; Belthran, Rebels Charge U.S. ChopperAttacked Village, United Press
Int'l, Feb. 21, 1987; De Arellano, supra note 80.
90 "This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts." Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 1, para. 2.
91 These include the right to life, and freedom from torture and slavery. Lysaght, supra not 30,
at 15-16, 19. The Government's policy of not taking prisoners prompted a threat of withdrawal by
the IRC and warnings by the U.S. Government. The Salvadoran Government changed its policy
and undertook to re-educate its military. Salvadoran Army Reportedly Improving Handling of Prisoners, Associated Press, July5, 1982 [hereinafter, Salvadoran Army].
92 See supra not 57 and accompanying text.
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rights and obligations of Protocol 11.9' The rebels are in a position where
they have nothing to lose by claiming to follow its provisions. 94 As mentioned before, state to state "interaction" is proscribed in article 3, paragraph 2, but there is no proscription on interaction between the rebels
and the government. This indicates that a situation could develop
whereby the FMLN, professing to undertake obligations under the Protocol, could force the state to respond and define how it perceives the
provisions to be applicable. 95

A. The Treatment of POWS
The government presently classifies catured rebels as political detainees rather than POWs 9 6-when they bother to accept their surrender
rather than kill them. 97 The rights of political detainees are few 98 under
both Salvadoran and international law, and monitoring visits by the IRC
are completely at the whim of the government.99 A political detainee

will receive none of the privileges that a POW will receive regarding in-

sulation from prosecution for acts committed in "battle." A POW is not
prosecuted for exercising, prior to capture, his or her "license to kill,
maim, or kidnap enemy combatants; destroy military objectives; and
cause unavoidable civilian casualties."°° Political detainess, however, can

be tried on charges ranging from high treason to disorderly conduct. If
the Protocol was applied, POW status would be granted to captured
rebels 0 1 and visits by the IRC would be guaranteed under the Geneva
Conventions.102 In addition, living conditions, medical care and other
aspects of detention and interrogation would be required to meet interna93 Goldman, supra note 78, at 550.
94 A rebel force has a political motivation for following the Protocol as it adds legitimacy to
their efforts. They may also gain support from the civilian population and "army troops will [become] more likely to surrender than fight... some [will] joinfl [the rebels] and others [are] simply
disarmed and released." Salvadoran Army, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
95 While the Protocol provides no legal forum other than that by which crimes of war may be
prosecuted, the Government might react to assertions by the FMLN in order to 1) justify policy
decisions to the Salvadoran people, and 2) influence world public opinion and persuade other states
that its actions are legitimate under international law. See supra note 55.
96 Sciolino, The War Behind the Lines in Iran and Iraq, N.Y Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at ] 4 at 22,
col.l.
97 CLEMENTS, supra note 3, at 163.
98 These have traditionally been considered an issue of state domestic law, and so are insulated
from international censure, other than a theoretical international minimum standard of fairness in
judicial proceedings.
99 Silino, supra note 96.
100 Goldman, supra note 78, at 545.
101 Once a conflict falls within the protocol, the Geneva Conventions will automatically apply.
See Draper, supra note 13, at 273.
102 See generally Geneva Conventions, supra note I IThe right to ICRC monitoring of internment conditions is just one of many rights a prisoner of war has).
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tional minimum standards. 10 3

In contrast, the FMLN generally grants captured Government
soldiers POW status.'1° POWs are usually given the choice of joining the
rebels or being turned over to the IRC. 10 5 The FMLN has asked the
IRC to participate in repatriation of these prisoners to the government. 10 6 The IRC has agreed, but the government has often refused to
accept the soldiers, asserting that the FMLN does not have the legal ability under international law to grant POW status. 10 7 The government
also considers these POWs deserters and they are punished upon their
return.' 8 This refusal to accept the soldiers, coupled with the fact that
the government refuses to apply the Protocol, indicates a governmental
belief that the Protocol would legitimize the FMLN as belligerants.
B.

The Treatment of Civilians
Morazan, one of the country's most embattled areas, was the scene of
another armed forces operation in December... 1981 ....The ham-

let of Mozote was completely wiped out ....The apparent sole survivor.., escaped by hiding behind trees near the house where she and
the other woman had been imprisoned. She has testified that on Friday, December 11, troops arrived and bgan taking people from their
homes at about 5 in the morning .... At noon, the men were blind-

folded and killed in the town's center. among them was [her] husband,
who was nearly blind. In the early afternoon the young women were
taken to the hill nearby, where they were raped, then killed and
burned. The old women were taked next and shot .... From her

hiding place, [she] heard soldiers discuss choking the children to death;
subsequently she heard the children calling for help, but not shots.
Among the children murdered were three of [hers], all under ten years
of age ....109
In the absence of Protocol II protection, the civilian population is
unprotected.1o As of 1983, it has been government policy to force sup1
porters of the insurgents to undergo relocation into refugee camps.
Forced relocation is addressed and forbidden by the Protocol. 112 Other
103

Id.; Protocol II, supra note 5, arts. 4-7.

104 Sciolino, supra note 96.
105 CLEMENTS, supra note 3,

at 93, 164.
See id.
107 See Salvadoran Army, supra note 91. The position of the Government is grounded in its
belief that Protocol II does not apply to its internal conflict.
108 CLEMENTS, supra note 3, at 164 (Some returned soldiers have even been killed for allegedly
being cowards).
109 DIDION, supra note 76, at 37, 38.
110 Protocol II, supra note 5, arts. 13-17.
111 Chavez, Aid for Rebels in a Hamlet in Salvador, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1984, at Al, col.5.
112 "The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons relating to the
106
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government policies that would be prohibited by the Protocol include
crop destruction, 113 emptying villages,114 and "disapperances." 11 5 These
policies are followed because they deprive the guerrilla forces of food and
terrorize the citizenry into refusing the FMLN shelter or aid.116
The rebels, on the other hand, believe themselves to have an obligation to safeguard non-combatants. This is seen in their cooperation with
the IRC in a national vaccination campaign for children" 7 and their policy of not recruiting children under fifteen years of age. 118 Negotiations
between the government and rebel forces produced a cease-fire on the
vaccination dates119 and safe passage into the rebel-held areas for health
workers./12 It should be noted, however, that at times the government
only waited until the IRC doctors had left the medical centers before
attacking all those still present; the villiage women and children."
Another aspect of the safeguarding obligation is that the FMLN
provides protection for civilians from abuse by the government forces
and death squads.122 They have gone to great efforts to establish schools
and medical clinics in the territories they control. 2 3 These rebel acts
have forced the government into setting forth a policy for when it is permissible to fire on civilians. This policy is basically ifyou can see a
weapon, shoot them 12 4 This is also the basic
rule separating combatants
25
and noncombatants under the Protocol.1
The FMLN's actions and the government's responses provide for
conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imparative military reasons so demand."
Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 1.
113 Chavez, surpa note 11, (describing the destruction of corn fields by the army). "It is...
prohibited to... destroy... objects indispensible to the survival of the civilian population such as
...crops." Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 14. While in an industrialized country, an ordinary corn
crop may not be vital to survival, but El Salvador's economy and the general population rely heavily
on its crop production. Agricultural workers comprise 47% of the labor force and coffee crops alone
account for 15% of GNP. DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 64, at 8.
114 Chavez, supra note 11. Protocol II, supra note 5, art. 17.
115 Broder, When Doctors 'Disappear',Wash. Post, June 26, 1983, at D7, col. 1. Protocol II,
supra note 5, arts. 9, 13.
116 The rebels receive their basic logistical support from friedly civilians. Chavez, supra note
111, at Al, col. 5.
117 De Arellano, supra note 80.
118 Allen, supra note 81 and accompanying text.
119 De Arellano, supra note 80.
120 Id.
121 See CLEMENTS, supra note 3, at 218-19.
122 Chavez, supra note 3, at Al, col. 5.
123 Ird
124 See SalvadoranArmy, supra note 91.
125 Rebels are obligated to openly carry arms preceding a military attack. This is the only way
a guerilla fighter is obligated to distinguish him or herself from the civiliam population. Gasser,
supra note 26, at 527 (interpreting what a combatant must do, under the Protocols, to set or herself
apart from the civilian population).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 21:203

the protection of noncombatants in a civil war. As seen by the preceding
analysis, it is apparent that the agreement can be easily circumvented.
Normally this would mean an end to the document as any basis for international law, since its provisions would never be implemented as interaction of policy and behavior in a civil war. However, due to the novel
nature of humanitarian law, a dialogue can develop that has never been
seen in international law before; not state to state, but rather combatting
force to combatting force.
The civil war in El Salvador provides an example without precedent.
The government is officially a Party to the Protocol, and the rebel forces
meet the threshold requirements. The government asserts the Protocol
does not apply. The rebels impliedly assert that it does, and that they
will uphold the values enunciated in it. While there have been episodes
of demand-response behavior an actual integration of policy and action
that reflects true adherence to the Protocol has not been achieved.
This is more than merely unfortunate. It means that innocent noncombatants are suffering loss of property, liberty and life at a rate that
would be totally impermissible if the combatants were two states. It also
means that a new aspect of international law, humanitarian law, will remain ineffectual and weak.
There is, however, one good aspect to this situation. The interaction
precedent, even though shallow, is a breakthrough in the development of
international law. It may be limited to humanitarian law because of its
peculiar domestic attributes, but these attributes may also mandate a totally new approach to the formation of international law. The world can
only wait to find out if this new approach is successful in future internal
conflicts.
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